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In the principal case, the dissenting opinion, favoring the retention
of the M'Naughten plus irresistible impulse test, said: "Rules of law of
long standing should not be cast aside lightly but only upon a sound
and meritorious basis. Such rules are not flapjacks and should not be
tossed about as such."25 This decision came less than thirty days after
the court upheld the test which it had followed for sixty-two years.26
Joseph Weintraub, Chief Justice of the New Jersey Supreme Court,
said in a recent article that as a practicing attorney, he fought for the
removal of the M'Naughten test and then as a judge, he realized that
the struggle between M'Naughten and its competitors is over an
28
irrelevancy 27 and refused to overturn the older rule.
This is not to say that M'Naughten and irresistible impulse are
the perfect solution. Given the fact that a defendant commits a
crime, he is at least slightly abnormal. 28 The primary purpose in this
field then, is to insure against repetition of criminal acts for the
protection of society. Obviously, some rule should be formulated
which will aid both legal and medical experts in their determination of
criminal responsibility. But until some better means to reach the
desired end are found, a rule which has proved durable and practical
for many years should not be rejected.
John Dixon, Jr.
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The petitioner, Gideon, convicted of a non-capital felony offense in a
Florida state court after entering a plea of not guilty, filed a habeas
corpus petition in the Florida Supreme Court. His petition alleged
that the trial court's denial of his request for court appointed counsel

abridged his constitutional rights as he was without funds with which
to retain counsel. The Florida Supreme Court, without opinion,
denied him relief.1 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari with leave to proceed in forma pauperis. 2 Held: Reversed. A
25

Terry v. Commonwealth, supra note 20, at 866.

26
Newsome
27

v. Commonwealth, 366 S.W.2d 174 (Ky. 1962).
Weintraub, Criminal Responsibilitu: Psychiatry Atone Cannot Determine It,
49 A.B.A.J.
1075 (1963).
28
State v. Lucas, 30 N.J. 37, 82, 152 A.2d 50, 74 (1959).
29
The article is based on this premise-Goldstein and Katz, Some Observations
on the Decision to Release Persons Acquitted by Reason of Insanity, 70 Yale L.J.
225 (1960-61).
1 Gideon v. Cochran, 135 So. 2d 746 (Fla. 1961).
2 Gideon v. Cochran, 370 U.S. 908 (1962). The Court appointed counsel to
represent Gideon on appeal and requested that the briefs discuss the question:

"Should this Court's holding in Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 ... be reconsidered?"
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defendant in a non-capital state felony prosecution who enters a plea
of not guilty and requests the court to appoint counsel to defend
him because he is indigent has a right to have counsel appointed. The
right to appointed counsel exists even where there are no special
circumstances involved in the case which would lead to the conclusion
that the accused would be denied a fair trial because of the absence
of counsel. The right to counsel is so fundamental that it is a right
which is essential to a fair trial, and the guarantee of the sixth
amendment is made obligatory on the states through the fourteenth
amendment. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
The Court, in the principal case, expressly overruled the holding
in the case of Betts v. Brady.3 The Betts case held that the sixth
amendment right to counsel is not such a fundamental right so as to
be essential to a fair trial. Thus, the Betts interpretation of the fourteenth amendment does not make the sixth amendment provision
obligatory upon the states in non-capital cases absent a showing
4
that the lack of counsel resulted in an unfair trial for the accused.
Basing its conclusion on dictum in Powell v. Alabama,5 to the effect
that the right to counsel in any criminal proceeding is a fundamental

right,( the Court said:
...reason and reflection require us to recognize that in our adversary
system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor
to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided
for him... . That government hires lawyers to prosecute and defendants
who have the money hire lawyers to defend are the strongest indications
7
...that lawyers in criminal courts, are necessities, not luxuries.

The decision in the principal case is one which a vigorous minority
of the Court has long urged.8 It is a decision which, in the opinion
of this commentator, will have a profound effect upon raising the
quality of justice in state criminal prosecutions. Prior to the Gideon
3316 U.S. 455 (1942).
4 For a detailed analysis of the rule and a comprehensive discussion of the
facts and circumstances surrounding the trial of Betts, see Kamisar, The Right to
Counsel and the Fourteenth Amendment: A Dialogue on "The Most Pervasive
Right of an Accused," 30 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1 (1962).
r,287 U.S. 45 (1932).
6Id. at 68 (dictum).
78 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 at 844 (1963).
Justice Black, Douglas, Murphy, and Rutledge in their dissents and concurring oinions have constantly urged that the Court should hold that the right to
counsel guaranteed by the sixth amendment is applicable to the states in both
capital and non-capital criminal proceedings: Camley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506,
519-20 (1962) (Black, J., concurring); McNeal v. Culver, 865 U.S. 109, 118
(1961) (Douglas, J., concurring); Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 677 (1948)
(Douglas, J., dissenting); Foster v. Illinois, 332 U.S. 134, 141 (1947) (Rutledge,
J., dissenting); Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 475 (1942) (Black, J., dissenting).
For an excellent summation of the views of these Justices and of the leading cases
on the right to counsel in general, see Batt, Equal Justice for All--Myth or Motto?,
1 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 325, 352-575 (1959).
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case, it had been established that there is a requirement of assigned
counsel for indigent defendants in state criminal proceedings involving
a capital offense. 9 The right to counsel assigned by the court in noncapital state felony proceedings where the assistance of counsel is
deemed essential to a fair trial is not waived by the defendant's entering a plea of guilty. 10 One case" held that where a plea of guilty was
entered and the right to court appointed counsel was specifically
waived by the defendant through fear, the waiver did not relieve the
court of the duty to appoint counsel since the presence of counsel to
assist in the defense was essential to a fair trial. From these cases,
it may be seen that the Court ventured to the edge of the special
circumstances rule in non-capital cases many times. At long last, in
Gideon the Court crossed the line.
The underlying principle involved in the instant case and in its
predecessors is simply that the states have failed to integrate the
practical economic problem of the indigent defendant with our conception that justice in criminal proceedings is best achieved through
the adversary system. The contest between the highly trained
prosecutor and the layman who has no training in the operational
and theoretical niceties of the law is no contest. In such cases, convictions are not obtained because of the strength of the prosecutions
case, but because of the weakness of the defense. The problem is not
new. The Court, as we have seen, has struggled with it for a long time.
Most of the states,'12 including Kentucky, 3 have made notable strides
toward its solution. Those which have hesitated, such as Florida, have
14
found that the hesitation was costly.
Indeed, the action taken by the Court in the principal case had
been predicted by at least one writer as far back as 1950:
9 Hamilton v. Alabama, 868 U.S. 52, 55 (1961).
10 Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 885 U.S. 487 (1948); Rice v. Olson, 824 U.S.
786 (1945).
112 Moore v. Michigan, 885 U.S. 155 (1957).
1 Thirty-five states appoint counsel on request in any felony case. Fifteen

either make no provision, limit appontent to capital cases, or leave it to the
trial judge's discretion. McNeal v. Culver, 865 U.S. 109, 119-22 (1961) (Douglas, J., concurring opinion-Appendix).
'3 Gholson v. Commonwealth, 808 Ky. 82, 212 S.W.2d 587 (1948), holding
that a defendant in a non-capital felony case who pleads guilty but neither requests
counsel nor waives his right to counsel in an intelligent, competent, understanding,
and voluntary manner has a right to counsel under Ky. Const. § 11 and the due
process clause of U.S.C. Const. Amend. 14. This case is noted in 88 Ky. LJ. 317
(1950).
14 Of the 8,000 prisoners in Florida penal institutions, 4,542 were convicted

without benefit of counsel. Already more than 3,000 have petitioned for

review of their convictions. Court calendars are jammed; distraught
p rosecutors are working overtime searching petitioner's records and
drawing up answering briefs; county budget directors are hunting desperately for funds to pay for retrials. Time, Oct. 18, 1968, p. 58.
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It would seem highly desirable that the states themselves take the
initiative in overhauling their criminal procedure instead of leaving the
fundamental rights of their citizens in such condition that they must
of
depend for enforcement upon further invasion by the Supreme Court
15
that domain traditionally belonging to the sovereign states alone.

Again, in 1959, it was said: "If local prosecutors and law enforcement
agencies would carry the banner of reform, a point for state sovereignty in the field would be cogently made." 16
The impact of the Gideon decision will be felt by the bar. It will
require more lawyers to devote more of their time to representing
indigent defendants. It is with the practicing lawyer that the ultimate
responsibility of solving the problem of the indigent defendant rests.
An exception to this is found in those localities which have adopted
some organized method of legal aid, such as the public defender
system. Whether the bar responds effectively to the Supreme Court's
call to seek to satisfy the ends of justice will, in large measure,
determine whether the Supreme Court will find it necessary to intercede more stringently and enumerate the means whereby those ends
are to be achieved.
The fact is simple. Until the present, the state, the bench, and the
bar have failed to extend the cloak of justice to a large segment of our
population. Whether this failure will be corrected in the near future
depends upon the extent to which the individual practicing lawyer
will willingly undertake his share of the remedial responsibility. This
in turn, depends upon whether the cry of humanity for effective
representation before our courts of justice will ring as loud in the
lawyer's ears as the rustle of currency. The test has come. It is up
to the legal profession to decide to what extent it believes in the
adversary system of justice which it propounds. Only the advocate
can make the abstract propositions of law by which our society and
our nation are governed workable in the ordinary events of men.
The problem of the indigent defendant is not limited to noncapital felony cases. It permeates that large segment of humanity
involved in the ordinary vagrancy cases. 17 It extends to administrative
proceedings, juvenile proceedings, and the police court. The step
taken by the Supreme Court is a gigantic one. It is encumbent upon
the individual lawyer and the local bar to see that it becomes an
effective one. Indeed, the scales of justice have just begun to balance.
Marvin Lee Henderson
15
16 Note, 88 Ky. L.J. 317, 325 (1950).
WBatt,
& Mary L. Rev. 325,
Equal Justice for A-Myth or Motto?, 1 Win.
373 (1959).
17 SeThompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960).

